

interested with this subject. All information provided was  
summarily explained away or discredited by the Defense  
Intelligence Agency.

Sworn to and subscribed this 27 day of January, 1986.

M. C. McIntire  
MELVIN C. MCINTIRE

Witness:

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U.S. Senate Committee, Veterans' Affairs  
Testimony of Major (Ret) Mark A. Smith

I am Mark A. Smith and I swear and affirm the following:

I have served in the United States Army since approximately  
1963 in the military grades of Private, Sergeant First Class, and  
eventually as an Officer. I received my officer's commission on  
the battlefield by then General Westmoreland in 1968 and  
thereafter commanded two United States Army Infantry Companies,  
advised Vietnamese airborne and ranger battalions and served in  
1972 as the ground Commander at Loc Ninh, Republic of Vietnam  
when it was overrun by multi division force of infantry and  
tanks. I served as a Prisoner of War and was held in Cambodia  
until my release in 1973 as part of Operation "Homecoming". I am  
authorized to wear the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver  
Star, nine awards of the Bronze Star, four awards of the Purple  
Heart and other decorations.

Approximately in April 1984 while assigned to the Special  
Forces Detachment-Korea there was an occasion when I was required  
to turn over certain information to an Army Major General. This  
information was generated because back in 1981 as the detachment  
commander I had been given a mission to gather intelligence on

DATA because of their ties to DATA

and on DATA and any other

DATA DATA In

approximately July 1981 the subject of American POW's first came

up when I was approached by DATA who was concerned about LT COL "Bo" Gritz. He said that Gritz's information supported or corroborated information that his own intelligence had obtained.

I was introduced to this DATA by a man who himself was a DATA prisoner of war for many years. I was introduced as an American POW and that is the contextual setting that we talked. These officers assumed that since Bo Gritz was in the country at the same time this conversation was taking place that I was somehow involved with the support and the POW rescue operation. At the time that was not a correct assumption.

I initially told this officer that I did not believe that there were any living Americans in Southeast Asia and he brought in his staff and the senior intelligence officer gave me a complete briefing on suspected and known locations of United States prisoners of war. The suspected and known locations of POWs as reported to me were all in Laos. I learned that the information had been developed through DATA. They stated that there was a possibility of obtaining evidence of the certainty of identification such as photographs and finger prints and similar evidentiary matters. This first meeting in July 1981 where these conversations took place was at DATA. After the briefing which I received I decided that there probably was some truth to the reports that there were living Americans in Southeast Asia. I was asked if I had a channel of communication which would bypass US Embassy Bangkok, CINCPAC and JCRC back to

Washington, D.C. to inform Washington, D.C. that they did have information that they would provide to me as long as they could be guaranteed that their sources would not be compromised.

I returned to my home station in Korea at Seoul and went to the military intelligence contact from DIA with whom SFD-K worked and drafted a message to DIA headquarters and to INSCOM. I saw this message and the message read that as long as the sources were not compromised these officers would provide information on locations and ID's of United States Prisoners of War in Laos. Five days later I was told that the sources would be closely guarded and no one in US Embassy Bangkok would be told of their identities. This message was sent within DIA channels in approximately August 1981. For approximately the next year and a half I went to Thailand every 60 to 90 days and got information from these sources and others. After being debriefed in August 1981 I operated under the general instructions from (DIA) to seek additional information about prisoners of war and MIAs.

After that time and until approximately April 1984 I, as the commander SFD-K returned from Korea to Thailand approximately once every two to three months and established an agent net among Laos, free Vietnamese and DATA. The purpose of which was to establish whether there were in fact live Americans in Southeast Asia who may be held against their will. Efforts were made to come up with definite locations and to conduct combined training of DATA with SFD-K. All of this was reported and sanctioned by the

representatives of the United States. These representatives were DIA operatives in Korea. These DIA representatives were receiving their instructions from INSCOM located at Fort Meade, Maryland. On three different occasions I briefed a man whose title was either a LT COL or GS-15 who was the head of the organization SFD-K was gathering information for. In 1984 there was a major compromise of one Laos agent who was reported to have been shot by the Vietnamese and compromised my contact with

DATA . I talked to an individual in the United States Embassy in Seoul to try and set up another channel which would allow me to bypass American Military Intelligence channels because of the constant compromises. I provided all the information that I had by that time to the Chief of the Research unit United States Embassy Seoul.

From approximately 1981 through 1984, I and others known to me continued to develop intelligence information. Among the intelligence information gathered was information relating to the location and identification of living Americans in Southeast Asia and or MIAs. This information was developed by talking with agents in DATA , the Laos resistance, the Pathet Lao, the free Vietnamese, gun smugglers, gold smugglers, drug smugglers and any one who could provide information. By the early part of 1982 I, and others, were convinced that there were American prisoners of war which were being held against their will. I came to this conclusion by cross checking the reports of approximately 50 different agents, the majority of whom had no

knowledge of each other and corroborated the information by cross matching. I had personal contacts with agents who confirmed that there were POWs. In April 1984 in conjunction with preparing a briefing paper for a certain U.S. Army Major General I received

DATA that there were three American prisoners of war available to be taken out of Laos in May 1984. When this information was passed to this Army Major General and to the 501st MI group and to CIA stationed in Seoul Korea all SFD-K operations to Thailand or to Southeast Asia were declared unauthorized and terminated. Prior to this time SFD-K operations had been going on for 3 1/2 years. The conclusion which I reached about the significance of this change in the method of operations is that the production of intelligence on American prisoners of war was determined by some agency of the US government to be unacceptable. I was told that it was no longer SFD-K's job to develop or have any further participation in the POW/MIA issue. I was told that if I wanted to be a LT COL in the Army that I should forget about the POW/MIA information which had been reported to intelligence channels for the past three years. I was told that in no uncertain terms that I should forget the matter. This conversation between this general and I took place in Seoul, Korea in the general's office approximately two weeks after I gave this American general the briefing folder with the subject entitled "Possible American/Allied POWs in Southeast Asia" - dated 10 April, 1984."


On or about 14 April 1984, the briefing package relating to the question of POWs in Southeast Asia was prepared by myself and personally delivered to this American general in his office in Seoul, Korea. After reading the two cover letters this general turned white, handed the briefing back to me and said "this is too hot for me to handle big guy." I told him at that time if you as a Major General can't handle this what am I suppose to do with it. I was told that if I was smart, what I would do was to put the briefing through a shredder and forget the entire issue. I demanded authorization to go to Washington, D.C. and see another General in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army. I was given a direct order not to have any more contact with that officer in Washington, D.C.

From the summer of 1983 until April 1984 LT COL Robert Howard was assigned as the chief combat support coordination team for special warfare command in Korea. On or about December 1983 I, SFC McIntire and LTC Howard were performing a joint training mission with the Thai military in Thailand. Prior to this on approximately 8 different occasions similar training had been participated in by us. On this particular occasion the purpose of the training was officially was to conduct high altitude-high opening parachute infiltration of an aggressor base followed by an airfield assault by a MACSOLL aircraft. If this mission had been flown along the intended route and the individuals had actually exited the aircraft with the prevailing winds a landing would have occurred approximately 20 miles inside the Laos

border. However, we cancelled the mission. Thai troops who were participating in the exercise had been issued a full combat load of ammunition, rations and had every appearance of going into an unfriendly area. The significance of this operation in December 1983 was that all factors clearly indicated that some one, some where had given a "green light" for an exercise into Laos, that the Thai military who were along were prepared for just that, that the U.S. Air Force had received some instructions from some where to fly a certain flight path and the aircraft which was provided was a stealth type aircraft clearly intended to facilitate the infiltration into Laos in a clandestine manner without informing either myself, SFC McIntire or LTC Howard. When the air crew was questioned by me as to why they changed the flight plan I was told they had received a new flight plan from the command center at Clark Air Force Base representing 13th Air Force.

In approximately September 1984, I was reassigned to the 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Specifically I was assigned to the Command Training detachment. Three weeks after my arrival I received my mandatory retirement orders given me a retirement of 1 February 1985. LTC Howard was also transferred from Korea.

Subscribed and sworn this \_\_\_\_ day of January, 1986.

  
Mark A. Smith

Witness:

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U.S. Senate Committee, Veterans' Affairs  
Testimony of Scott T. Barnes

I am SCOTT T. BARNES and hereby swear and affirm under penalty of perjury:

I currently am a citizen and resident of the State of California. I am married and have three children. I am currently employed as a college teacher and have been employed in that capacity for approximately four months. I have a date of birth of 19 June 1954 and have completed high school and five years of college. I have been honorably discharged from the United States Army.

I have experience in general law enforcement activities with particular emphasis in the area of intelligence and organized crime investigations over the approximate period of time beginning June 1975 through approximately January 1981. During that period of time I was employed by private police departments and worked for special law enforcement details. In approximately April 1981 while I was in Hawaii I was contacted by Hughes Aircraft on behalf of a man identified to me as Bo Gritz. Shortly after this I was contacted by a man who identified himself to me as LTC Bo Gritz. This initial contact was by telephone while I was still in Hawaii. I told LTC Gritz on this

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occasion that I would agree to introduce him to General Vang Pao who was known to me to be the Major General for the CIA-Laotian Forces who was then living in California. It was apparent to me at the time that the reason LTC Gritz contacted me was because I was able to introduce him to General Vang Pao.

My relationship with General Vang Pao by this time had been a close acquaintance. Shortly after this phone call from this man who identified himself as LTC Gritz I received a package which was personally delivered to me in Hawaii. COL Gritz had referenced this package in the phone call which I received from him earlier. The package arrived by a personal courier and contained intelligence documents pertaining to living American Prisoners of War in Laos, biographical sketches on LTC Gritz explaining who he was as well as a defense intelligence letter from General Aaron addressed to LTC James G. Gritz. The correspondence from General Aaron to LTC Gritz is attached as Exhibit A attached hereto. By this time it was my understanding after having these conversations with LTC Gritz, that I was being requested to accept his offer of employment to travel to Thailand to make preliminary arrangements to conduct an operation which had as its purpose the identification and extraction of living American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia and in particular Laos. After these initial contacts with LTC Gritz I attempted to establish whether or not this was a sanctioned activity by the

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United States Government. In order to learn this I spoke with two officials of the Defense Intelligence Agency by telephone between Hawaii and Washington, D.C. I identified myself to them as well as the stated purpose of LTC Gritz's operation. These two individuals confirmed to me that COL Gritz's operation was "a chartered activity".

I was instructed by LTC Gritz to deliver a package to the Commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) in Bangkok, Thailand. The legitimacy of the Gritz's operation was also confirmed by two other activity duty full colonels who were at that time were assigned in Washington D.C. The reason that I contacted these people in Washington, D.C. and within the Defense Intelligence Agency was that I had been requested to do so by LTC Gritz in order to allow me to confirm the legitimacy of his intended operation.

I agreed to participate in this operation with LTC Gritz because of the interesting aspect of the exercise and because I was being offered a considerable amount of money to go along. In June of 1981 I left from Hawaii and went to Bangkok, Thailand. Previous instructions led me to a contact agent and I eventually made it to the United States Embassy in Bangkok. I spoke there with United States Embassy officials who confirmed to me that they were expecting to see me. At the instructions of LTC Gritz

I delivered his package to the Commander of the JCRC in the United States Embassy in Bangkok. On this initial meeting I met with the Commander JCRC and other United States Government Intelligence Officials. All of these individuals identified themselves to me. Some were active duty United States Army Military Intelligence and some were intelligence employees of the US Embassy in Bangkok. It was obvious by the manner of our conversations and their discussions with me that they expected my arrival as well as the package from LTC Gritz. During this initial meeting which lasted approximately 2 to 3 hours I learned that it had been confirmed that there were living American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia. Four specific files were identified to me and I was told that "these are the people we are concerned with on this mission" by the Commander of JCRC. I was also told that every effort was to be made to discredit a man named PFC Robert Garwood at this meeting. Prior to this occasion I had never met or heard of any of the names which were identified. Also at this first meeting I was informed that the purpose of the Gritz's operation was to send in a ground reconnaissance team to confirm the existence of at least two Caucasians in Laos and I learned that the Gritz's operation was responsible for the ground reconnaissance confirmation.



I was then given instructions by the commander of the JCRC to travel south of Aranyaprathet, Thailand with an agent who would take me to a Khmer Rouge Camp in order to deliver another package there in Cambodia for the Commander of JCRC. It was my understanding at the time that this was an on going part of the Bo Gritz operation. At this time I was being primarily used as a courier and I believe now that it was being done to test my reliability. I was also instructed that Task Force 80 would arrange to let me through into Cambodia with my contact agent. I did as I was instructed and traveled with this contact agent into Cambodia and into a Khmer Rouge Camp. I was there for approximately three hours and while I was there I saw American made weapons such as light anti-tank weapons, automatic weapons and others. This was the first and last time I had been in Cambodia. I delivered a package to the Khmer Rouge Camp and returned back to the United States Embassy Bangkok and JCRC where I was debriefed and again discussed what had transpired with the same individual mentioned above.

Following this I traveled back to the United States to California and there met with LTC Gritz, personally, for the first time. He identified himself to me, requested me to introduce him to General Vang Pao. Following this I received monetary compensation from LTC Gritz and he showed me a great deal more money in his home in Westchester, California. He again

asked to me introduce him to General Vang Pao and introduced me to other members of his team. I was introduced as the only man among the team who had any contact with General Vang Pao. Eventually I did as requested and did introduce him to General Vang Pao. This happened in California at which time General Vang Pao expressed concern that LTC Gritz was heading an official United States Government mission which caused him concern because previous information had been given by General Vang Pao to the United States Government and it had not been utilized.

Consequently in order to convince General Vang Pao that this was not an official mission by the United States Government a meeting was set up with an aide to Congressman Robert Dornan, a United States Congressman, in his offices in Los Angeles. General Vang Pao was assured by LTC Gritz that his operation was privately funded and not an official operation of the United States Government. These discussions to convince General Vang Pao that this was a private operation took place on or about the 26th of August 1981 as evidenced by Exhibit B attached hereto which is a sign-in ledger from Congressman Dornan's office evidencing that this meeting took place between LTC Gritz and General Vang Pao on this particular date. Eventually the operation was continued because it had received the blessing of General Vang Pao who was convinced that this is not an official

exercise of the United State Government. I along with three other members of this team traveled to Bangkok carrying a considerable amount of military equipment which included Hughes Aircraft and Litton Industries radio equipment, camera equipment, recording devices, high powered binoculars, and cryptographic equipment. The other three members of this team who traveled with me were under the command of LTC Gritz. No one was in uniform and when we arrived on Flight #1, Pan American Airlines, we were quickly escorted through customs directly to the hotels where we stayed preliminarily in Bangkok. We were met by representatives from the United States Embassy one of whom was escorted by two armed United States Marine Guards. Attached at Exhibit C to my affidavit are business cards which we utilized as a cover during this operation to establish the fact that we were in fact a private mission rather than one from the United States Government. Also attached at Exhibit D to this affidavit is one copy of my United States passport and visa showing entry and departure to Bangkok on or about 15 June 1981 and 25 June 1981 respectively. This was the period of time that I entered into Cambodia via Thailand. At Exhibit E is a copy of my United States passport and visa entry showing my second trip to Thailand on or about 21 October 1981 and departure on or about 3 November 1981.

We were then instructed by a United States Embassy Official whose name is known to me that we were to immediately depart to the northeast quadrant of Thailand. Prior to arriving at Udorn and while in Bangkok I was shown weapons which were to be used by the Gritz's ground reconnaissance team. These consisted of AR 180 automatic weapons with teflon ammunition. We were flown to Udorn Airbase on Thai Airways and met there with a Thai military escort. We then traveled to NKP, Thailand. Eventually we made contact with agents identified to us as representatives of General Vang Pao who at the time were indigenous guerrillas. I crossed into Laos with another American who identified himself as Mike J. Baldwin and approximately 30 indigenous individuals. The purpose of this operation was according to my understanding to confirm or deny the previous intelligence reports of the exact location of living American POWs in Laos. To the best of my recollection we traveled approximately 27 kilometers east into Laos into the Mahaksi region. We eventually arrived at a triangular shaped prison camp on approximately the 21st of October of 1981. From the elevation of where we were located we were able to look down at an angle to the area of the prison camp. We remained at this location for approximately 15 to 30 minutes and while there observed peasants, guards in towers and two men who were clearly Caucasian. These men were observed by myself through the photographic and telephoto lenses which we



were using at the time. The men were white skinned, wearing shirts and trousers and because of their size and skin color were clearly Caucasian. The approximate distance which we were from these individuals was 600 feet but I emphasize that this is an approximation only. At this same time approximately 400 rapid-exposure photographs were taken in order to confirm the existence of these Caucasians. Once the confirmation was made we immediately left this location and returned to Thailand. I returned to NKP, Thailand and the other American who was with me (identified above) returned to Thailand through a different route. Upon my arrival back to Thailand at NKP I was met by the other three members of COL Gritz's team. By that time LTC Gritz had been fired from his position as commander of this operation for reasons unknown to me at the time. However, when I arrived at NKP I was met by these other three members of his team that I traveled to Thailand with and I was then informed that we had received a communication from the United States Embassy and another communication came over the DOE telex that if the presence of Caucasian was confirmed at this location that the "merchandise was to be liquidated". The support operations which had been previously arranged to make an extraction had been cancelled without explanation. I confirmed to the other three members of the team that I was with that I saw the two Caucasians. I refused to participate in this operation further,

mailed the photographs which I took back to the United States to a predesignated address. I immediately returned back to the United States.

After I left NKP and returned to the United States I have no personal knowledge concerning whether the mission was continued and completed.

This \_\_\_\_ day of January, 1986.

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SCOTT BARNES

Witnesses:

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